Supreme Court: States Can Be Sued for Denying Access to Persons with Disabilities
Feature Story by Christine E. Kirk - 4/27/2005
This article is part of a civilrights.org series that examines civil rights-related decisions issued during the Supreme Court's October 2003 Term.The implications of the Supreme Court's decision in Tennessee v. Lane likely extend beyond court access alone, as Title II generally prohibits discrimination against individuals with disabilities with respect to the services and activities of public entities, as well as prohibits public entities from excluding individuals with disabilities from participating in such programs.
In Lane, a closely-divided Supreme Court held that states may be sued under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) for failing to provide court system access to persons with disabilities.
Barriers to the Courthouse
The case involved the claims of George Lane and Beverly Jones that they had been unlawfully denied access to the Tennessee state court system. Both individuals are paraplegic and rely on wheelchairs for mobility.
Required to appear in court on the second floor of a county courthouse with no elevator, George Lane crawled up two flights of stairs to reach the courtroom. When required to return to the courthouse for a hearing, Mr. Lane refused to crawl again or have officers carry him to the courtroom. He was then arrested and jailed for failure to appear in court.
Beverly Jones, a certified court reporter, had repeatedly requested accommodations for wheelchairs. Her requests were denied.
Lane and Jones filed an action against the state of Tennessee and several counties, alleging past and ongoing violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"). The district court denied the state's motion to dismiss the lawsuit on state immunity grounds, and the U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed.
Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court on May 17, 2004, joined by Justices O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer. Justice Souter filed a concurring opinion in which Justice Ginsburg joined, and Justice Ginsburg filed a concurring opinion in which Justices Souter and Breyer joined. Chief Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, and Justices Scalia and Thomas each filed separate dissenting opinions.
Supreme Court Majority Opinion
The Lane case required the Court to consider issues of legislative intent, constitutional interpretation, Congressional authority, and federalism, among other things (See description of key information and concepts).
Beginning first with a discussion of the consideration and passage of the ADA by Congress, the Court noted that the ADA represented the culmination of decades of investigation and deliberation by Congress with respect to the need for broad legislation to address pervasive discrimination against persons with disabilities.
According to the Court, by its own description, the ADA is intended to provide a comprehensive national mandate to end discrimination against persons with disabilities in three major areas of public life: employment, public services, and public accommodations.
The Court also observed that the enforcement provision in Title II incorporates another statutory provision by reference, § 505 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §794a. Section 505 authorizes private citizens to bring suits for money damages. According to the Court, by bringing that provision into Title II, Congress demonstrated its intent to make public entities subject to private suits for violations of Title II.
Finding that the ADA expressly provides for abrogation of state immunity, the Court went on to determine whether or not Congress acted within its authority in passing Title II of the ADA and abrogating state immunity to suits brought under it.
Under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress is provided an enforcement power that enables it to abrogate state immunity from lawsuits. While this enforcement power is very broad, it is not unlimited; moreover, Congressional use of this power must be constitutionally valid.
More specifically, although Congress must be allowed a wide latitude in developing appropriate measures to: (i) remedy past and existing unconstitutional actions (remedial legislation); and (ii) prevent future violations (prophylactic legislation), the measures are not allowed to result in a "substantive change in the governing law" (substantive redefinition).
According to the Court, whether a given piece of legislation is permissible remedial or prophylactic legislation or impermissible unconstitutional substantive redefinition will turn on whether the proposed legislation "fits" the identified constitutional violations both in a qualitative sense--providing logical measures to remedy or prevent the violations, and in a quantitative sense--providing measures that are not overly broad and that are properly tailored to meet the objectives of the legislation.
Applying this analysis to Title II, the Court discussed the fact that Congress enacted Title II in the context of "pervasive unequal treatment of persons with disabilities in the administration of state services and programs, including systematic deprivations of fundamental rights." The Court cited a variety of sources in discussion of the historical record, including a number of court decisions identifying unconstitutional treatment of disabled persons by state agencies.
With respect to barriers that prevent access to the courts and court services, the Court described specific information available to Congress on this issue. This information included reports that many individuals, in many states, are or had been excluded from courthouses and court proceedings by reason of their disabilities. One report before Congress found that 76% of public services and programs housed in state-owned buildings were inaccessible to and unusable by disabled persons.
According to the Court, the Congressional finding of pervasive discrimination against persons with disabilities in access to public services, combined with the extensive evidentiary record, made clear beyond doubt "that inadequate provision of public services and access to public facilities was an appropriate subject for prophylactic legislation."
Turning finally to the question of whether Title II was an appropriate response to the historical pattern of discrimination against persons with disabilities, the Court took a narrowly focused approach to Title II, directly addressing only the issue of access to the court system, rather than the full range of public services, programs, and activities to which persons with disabilities are guaranteed access.
Given the long history of unequal treatment in the court system that individuals with disabilities have experienced, and the persistence of such treatment in spite of numerous state and federal legislative efforts to remedy the problem, the Court found that Congress was justified in concluding that "the difficult and intractable problem" of discrimination against persons with disabilities required additional preventive action.
Moreover, the remedy chosen by Congress was sufficiently specific and limited; and not overly burdensome. Under these circumstances, and in light of past and present injury to the due process rights of disabled persons, the Court concluded that Title II's affirmative obligation to accommodate disabled persons is a reasonable prophylactic measure, and that it is "reasonably targeted to a legitimate end."
Dissenting Opinions
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion (joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas) stated that Title II was overbroad and that failed the congruence and proportionality test. The dissent stated that the majority failed to find sufficient evidence before Congress in order to demonstrate that states have engaged in unconstitutional actions with regard to dis
