The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights

Volume 8 no. 2

The cases from Texas, Bush v. Vera, No. 94-805, Lawson v. Vera, No. 94-806, and U.S. v. Vera, No. 94-988 were consolidated and one hour allocated for oral argument. Similarly, the North Carolina cases, Shaw v. Hunt, No. 94-923 and Pope v. Hunt, No.94-924 were consolidated for a one hour oral argument.

The Shaw case is the latest appeal in a case that was initially decided by the Supreme Court in June 1993. The Court concluded that "a plaintiff challenging a reapportionment statute under the Equal Protection Clause may state a claim by alle ging that the legislation, though race-neutral on its face, rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to separate voters into different districts on the basis of race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification." O n remand from the Supreme Court, the three-judge panel of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina ruled 2-1 that the challenged majority African-American congressional districts "did not violate any rights of the plaintiffs or their supporting intervenors." The panel reasoned that the North Carolina plan met a compelling state interest because it was developed in compliance with the Voting Rights Act, and apart from the Voting Rights Act, its purpose was to eradicate the effects of past and present racial discrimination in North Carolina's political process. The panel further found that the plan was narrowly tailored to achieve that goal. That decision is now back before the Supreme Court.

For further discussion, see CIVIL RIGHTS MONITOR, vol. 7, nos. 3, 4, and 6.

In the Texas cases, a three-judge panel of the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Texas, ruled on August 17, 1994 that majority-minority congressional districts 18, 29, and 30 were unconstitutional. The court stated:

"[The districts] were conceived for the purpose of providing 'safe' seats in Congress for two African-American and an Hispanic representatives. They were scientifically designed to muster a minimum percentage of the favored minority or ethnic group; minority numbers are virtually all that mattered in the shape of those districts. Those districts consequently bear the odious imprint of racial apartheid, and districts that intermesh with them are necessarily racially tainted....

"We do not hold that the state may only draw Congressional boundaries with a blind eye toward race, a goal which would be impossible, nor that it is altogether prohibited from creating majority-minority districts. But when the State redraws the boun daries of Districts 18, 29, and 30 and contiguous districts, it can and must exhibit respect for neighborhoods, communities, and political subdivision lines. As the Supreme Court put it, appearances do matter. In appearance and in reality, these three districts were racially gerrymandered."

On the same day that it announced that it would hear the North Carolina and Texas cases, in a redistricting case from California, DeWitt v. Wilson, No. 94-275, the Court affirmed, without opinion, a three-judge District Court panel's grant of the S tate's motion for summary judgment in a challenge to the State's 1992 redistricting plan. The challenge alleged that the State's 1992 redistricting plan relied on "race-conscious" reapportionment and diluted white voter strength in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th amendment and the 15th amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

On the redistricting issue, the three-judge panel distinguished this case from Shaw, finding that in drawing the California redistricting plan the special masters appointed by the State Supreme Court balanced traditional redistricting principles in cluding the requirements of the Voting Rights Act.

The panel concluded:

"the Masters' redistricting plan, as approved by the California Supreme Court, is not racial gerrymandering, but rather a thoughtful and fair example of applying traditional redistricting principles, while being conscious of race. Thus, we find that the plaintiffs have failed to state a claim of racial gerrymandering. We conclude that in the context of redistricting, where race is considered only in applying traditional redistricting principles along with the requirements of the Voting Rights Act, that strict scrutiny is not required. However, if it were required, we conclude that this California redistricting plan has been narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest."

In another redistricting matter, on September 8, 1995, the Supreme Court granted a stay of orders issued by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio directing the State of Ohio to redraw state legislature districts that were declared unco nstitutional by the court. The stay was granted until further order of the Court. The State has appealed the district court's orders, Voinovich v. Quilter, No. 95-378 and No. 95-132.

This case was previously before the Supreme Court in 1993 when the Court reversed the district court panel's decision that the State's legislative plan which created a number of majority-minority districts was violative of Voting Rights Act, Sec. 2 and al so violated the Fifteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The district court had additionally held that the plan violated the Fourteenth Amendment because it "departed from the requirement that all districts be of nearly equal population." The Supreme Court remanded this claim "for further proceedings on whether the plan's deviation from equal population among the districts violated the Fourteenth Amendment."

On remand the district court allowed the plaintiffs to amend their complaint to raise the question whether Ohio's race-conscious plan violated the Fourteenth Amendment in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Shaw v. Reno. On the first issue th e district court found that the reapportionment plan "survived strict scrutiny under the one-person one-vote guarantee of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."

On the second issue, the district court panel held 2-1 that "the Ohio Apportionment Board's consideration of race in its 1992 redistricting plan violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." The panel reasoned that the esta blishment of "demonstrated white and African-American coalitional voting for legislative seats in Ohio," and the failure of the state to establish a compelling state reason for "using race as the predominant factor in drawing the legislativ e lines" were sufficient to find certain districts unconstitutional. The State has filed two jurisdictional statements before the Court, and the appellees have filed two motions to dismiss the appeal. The State's jurisdictional statements to the Cou rt raise several technical questions and the following:

Did the district court err in allowing this action to be maintained with respect to those electoral districts in which no plaintiff suffered any cognizable injury?

Did the district court err by (a) ruling that a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of racial gerrymandering without establishing that the state redistricting officials relied on race in substantial disregard of customary and traditional dis tricting principles, and if not, (b) by ruling that, on the evidence before it, the defendants had given less weight to traditional districting principles than to racial considerations?

If the district court did not err in holding that plaintiffs had made out a prima facie case requiring strict scrutiny of defendants' actions, did the court err in concluding that the defendants had failed to establish a compelling interest justify ing those actions.>