The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights

Volume 9 Number 1

SUPREME COURT RULES "ENGLISH-ONLY" CASE MOOT

On March 3, 1997, the Supreme Court in a unanimous decision written by Justice Ginsburg declined to rule on the merits of a constitutional challenge to an Amendment to the Arizona Constitution that establishes English as the official language of the state . The Court dismissed the case because the state employee who challenged the amendment had resigned seven years ago, and thus the issue was moot, Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona No.95-974. The Court's ruling set-aside both the Ninth Cir cuit's decision and the District Court's that Arizona could not require state employees to speak only English on the job.

The Court's decision clears the way for a ruling as to the meaning and effect of the Amendment by the Arizona Supreme Court in a similar challenge before that court.

At the oral argument, on December 5, 1996, the Justices questions made it clear that the case would likely be decided on procedural grounds rather than on the merits thereby leaving the constitutional issues unresolved.

Background

In 1988, by a margin of 50.5% to 49.5%, Arizona voters added Article XXVIII to the Arizona Constitution declaring English the State's "official" language. Article XXVIII provides that English is "the language of the ballot, the public schools, and all government functions and actions." A few exceptions allow other languages to be used in protecting the rights of criminal defendants and victims, to protect the public health and safety, to teach a "foreign" language and to comply with federal laws. Tw enty-three other states recognize English as their official language.

Following passage of the ballot initiative, Maria-Kelley Yniguez, a state employee, filed suit alleging Article XXVIII violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. In processing medical-malpractice claims, Ms. Ynigu ez used English when speaking to English-speaking citizens and Spanish when speaking to Spanish-speaking citizens. The District Court issued a judgment in Yniguez's favor, finding the English-only Amendment overly restrictive under the First and Fourteen th Amendments.

When the State decided not to appeal the ruling, Arizonans for Official English (AOE), the principal sponsors of the English-Only proposition, and Robert Park, AOE's President, were permitted by the Court of Appeals to intervene and appeal the judgment . The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision, ruling that Article XXVIII violated the First Amendment rights of public employees and elected officials. AOE then appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States.

The Decision

In dismissing cases as moot, the decision of the Court is usually limited to a few sentences or paragraphs. This case is notable in that Justice Ginsburg authored a 35 page opinion suggesting to some Court observers that she was providing a road map o n the handling of challenges to new or previously not authoritatively interpreted state laws by federal courts. The opinion is also clearly critical of the lower courts' handling of the case:

"The Ninth Circuit had no warrant to proceed as it did. The case had lost the essential elements of a justiciable controversy and should not have been retained for adjudication on the merits by the Court of Appeals. We therefore vacate the Ninth Circ uit's judgment, and remand the case to that court with directions that the action be dismissed by the District Court. We express no view on the correct interpretation of Article XXVIII or on the measure's constitutionality."

The opinion further states that interpretation of a State statute should begin with the state courts where certification is possible [Federal law provides a process for federal courts to send an unresolved question about a state law to the state court for resolution. State courts must be authorized by state statute in order to respond. Arizona courts have such authority].

"In litigation generally, and in constitutional litigation most prominently, courts in the United States characteristically pause to ask: Is this conflict really necessary?...When anticipatory relief is sought in federal court against a state statute, respect for the place of the States in our federal system calls for close consideration of that core question...'Normally this Court ought not to consider the Constitutionality of a state statute in the absence of a controlling interpretation of its meani ng and effect by the state courts.'... Arizona's Attorney General, in addition to releasing his own opinion on the meaning of Article XXVIII...asked both the District Court and the Court of Appeals to pause before proceeding to judgment; specifically, he asked both courts to seek, through the State's certification process, an authoritative construction of the new measure from the Arizona Supreme Court." (citations and footnotes omitted.)