Investigating the Defeat of Colorado’s Amendment 46
An Analysis of the Trends and Principal Factors Influencing Voter Behaviors
Full Report (PDF)
Executive Summary
In November 2008, Colorado voters considered a ballot
initiative intended to end affirmative action in public
education, employment, and contracting in the state. Known by
proponents as the “Colorado Civil Rights Initiative,”
Amendment 46 would have prohibited “discrimination or
preferential treatment in public employment, public education,
and public contracting,” effectively ending affirmative
action in Colorado. This same language has been introduced and
approved in four other states, including California’s
Proposition 209 in 1996, Washington’s Initiative 200 in
1998, Michigan’s Proposal 2 in 2006, and Nebraska’s
Initiative 424 in 2008.
In a reversal of past trends and contradictory to polling
predictions, Coloradans voted to defeat the ballot measure by a
margin of fewer than 40,000 votes (1,046,970 vs. 1,080,238).
This study aimed to gain detailed understanding of what led
Coloradans to defeat Amendment 46, using a multiple-methods
research design including:
a) statistical analyses of a
large-scale survey of Colorado voters, b) in-depth qualitative
analyses of interview data from 20 key opponents and proponents
of the ballot initiative, and c) qualitative analyses of print,
electronic, and broadcast media content examining what public
information was available to voters, how media depicted Amendment
46, and which experts were consulted most often.
Primary Factors Influencing the Vote
We found three primary factors that influenced the outcome of
the vote:
1) Voter attitudes about affirmative action; 2) Voter
confusion about the intent, meaning, and consequences of
Amendment 46; and 3) Specific oppositional efforts such as
proposed alternative initiatives—Initiatives 61 and
82—and newspaper editorial stances.
Our analyses suggest that Coloradans overwhelmingly intended
to support affirmative action on Election Day; arguably, were
Amendment 46 a clearly worded referendum on attitudes toward
affirmative action, it would have failed by a much wider margin:
66 to 34 percent. To account for the large number of voters who
misinterpreted the outcome of the amendment, we created a
variable to approximate each voter’s intended support of
affirmative action. Analyses of open-ended responses in the voter
survey underscore this central finding: Alarmingly few voters
could accurately explain the consequences of passing Amendment
46.
Accordingly, analyses of survey data suggest that many voters
were confused by the language and intent of Amendment 46. Of the
507 surveyed, 261 voters reported that when they voted, they
believed a “Yes” vote was in favor of affirmative
action, and another 46 were unsure about the intent of the
amendment. This means that more than 60% of the sample was
confused in some capacity about the meaning of the initiative.
More specifically, however, most of those voters were not simply
confused about the amendment, but were mistaken in their
interpretation of the intended outcome.
A statistical model of voting behavior suggests that, holding
all other relevant factors constant, someone who is con- fused
about the intent of Amendment 46 is nearly 4.5 times more likely
to vote “Yes” than someone who is not confused.
Moreover, the effects of confusion are magnified for individuals
who favor affirmative action and mistakenly believed Amendment 46
would preserve it; our data suggest voters with positive
attitudes about affirmative action were more likely to be
confused. Thus, analyses from the voter survey indicate that a)
attitudes toward affirmative action and b) interpretation of the
intent of the initiative were the two strongest predictors of
voting behavior.
Campaign and Media Influence
Some—although certainly not all—campaign
activities and public media also influenced the outcome of the
vote. For example, those who sought out public media (e.g., via
blogs or newspapers) and those who turned to official voting
recommendations were more likely to vote “No” on 46.
Overwhelmingly, voters relied most heavily on print and broadcast
news reporting, with over 65% consulting this type of media once
a week or more. This is an important finding in the con- text of
this study, because it lends credibility to inferences drawn
about the influence of media in the media content analysis.
Unlike consultation of public media, influence from campaign
activities was a slight predictor of a “Yes” vote.
That said, at least one campaign activity—grassroots
canvassing— is associated with voters’ intended
support of affirmative action, but not their actual vote. Our
data suggest that confusion surrounding the intent of Amendment
46 may explain the disconnect between intended votes and actual
votes.
In the print and electronic news media coverage analyzed,
there were a total of 972 coded instances of various media frames
invoked to characterize anti-46 and pro-46 arguments. To be
clear, media content analysis does not shine a spotlight on how
either side organized or ran their campaign; rather, we focused
on the messages most often cited or referenced in the media. The
most cited anti-46 arguments include:
a) Amendment 46 is deceptive on multiple levels;
b) Amendment
46 affects not only university admissions, but also recruitment,
retention, and scholarship programs that target underrepresented
populations; and
c) Racism and oppression still exist today, and
affirmative action is needed to push back against
inequalities.
The most common pro-46 arguments were:
a) Affirmative action
is a form of preferential treatment;
b) Affirmative action is
tantamount to discrimination (i.e., “reverse
discrimination”);
c) Because affirmative action is not
based on “true” merit and consistent standards,
beneficiaries are harmed and/ or seen as unqualified; and
d) Race
is not definable and America has essentially become
post-racial.
While editorials generally took clear stances either for or
against Amendment 46, the news articles did not tend to lean one
way or the other. Instead, most news articles covered themes
peripheral to Amendment 46 or shared points from both Amendment
46 supporters and opponents. That said, people or groups
connected with the pro-46 campaign were quoted or mentioned more
than twice as often as people or groups associated with the
anti-46 campaign (317 versus 127 times across the 355 artifacts
analyzed).
Themes from Interviews
Analysis of the stakeholder interviews revealed a number of
salient themes. The originators of Amendment 46 frequently argued
that the initiative was a promising first step toward delivering
equal opportunity and a color-blind/gender-blind society. Four of
the nine pro-46 interviewees stated that their primary message
was one of “fairness” or “equality.” The
anti- 46 campaign argued that the initiative would actually
diminish equal opportunity for people underrepresented in public
higher education, employment, and contracting. Both opponents and
proponents of the initiative agreed the impact of the alternative
initiatives were likely related to 46’s defeat in Colorado.
Other pro-46 advocates observed that their opposition simply ran
an effective campaign.
Conclusion
In sum, this study of voters’ attitudes and behaviors,
media coverage of Amendment 46, and campaign leaders’
perceptions suggests that in order to preserve equal opportunity
programs such as affirmative action, advocates should take a
proactive role in educating the public about ballot initiatives
aimed at dismantling civil rights policies. As such, five central
recommendations emerge from the study’s results:
1) Ballot initiatives with the same or similar wording as
Amendment 46 should be rewritten to clarify the intent, meaning,
and consequences of the new law that would be passed. States need
to make sure the intent, meaning, and consequences of such
initiatives are much clearer to voters. More clarity on such
initiatives may help get a more accurate outcome based on
voters’ intent.
2) Educating voters about the intent,
meaning, and consequences of the initiative should be the first
priority for advocates.
3) Advocacy leaders ought to have one
primary spokesperson to provide information to the media.
4)
Education and advocacy efforts should begin well before petition
signatures are collected to get the initiative on the ballot.
5)
Advocates should plan for both traditional grassroots and
door-to-door education efforts, and also for the use of new media
and technologies in communicating their message to the
public.
Full report (PDF)
