The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights

• Table of Contents
• Executive Summary
• Introduction
• I. Creating the Commission
• II. The Commission’s Early Years
• III. The 60s: Laying the Foundation for Legislation
• IV. The 70s: School Desegregation and an Expanded Mandate
• V. The 80s: Dismantling the Commission
• VI. The 90s: The Commission Devolves
• VII. The Post-Millennial Commission
• Conclusion
• Recommendations
• Acknowledgements

The 60s: Laying the Foundation for Legislation

Civil Rights March on the National Mall, Washington, D.C., August 28, 1963.

With the election of President John F. Kennedy in 1960, expectations were high that significant progress might be made in civil rights. Kennedy had run on a platform endorsing civil rights enforcement, but his narrow victory and his dependence on southern senators for enactment of his legislative programs led him to be cautious in his first few years in office.⁴⁴ Significantly, though, in his first year in office, he made several key appointments to the commission. He nominated Erwin Griswold, dean of Harvard Law School, and Spottswood W. Robinson, III, dean of Howard Law School, to replace resigning commissioners Doyle Carleton and George Johnson. While these appointments retained the bipartisan nature of the commission and the informal tradition of regional balance, they did change the commission’s character. There was no longer any political representation; all the commissioners were now from the legal or academic world. Nor was there any member of the commission remaining who was an avowed advocate of segregation, as Carleton and Battle had been. Kennedy also nominated as staff director Berl Bernhard, a Yale law school graduate who had been with the commission from the beginning. The previous staff director, Gordon Tiffany, had come under fire not only for political reasons but also for his management practices. The new leadership was welcomed by the commission chair himself.⁴⁵

During the 1960s, while continuing to focus primarily on African-American voting rights in the South, the commission expanded its focus to include other issues such as discrimination in health care facilities and the administration of justice. It also investigated discrimination against Mexican Americans in its hearings in Los Angeles in 1960. In addition, the commission began to explore the issue of unemployment in the African-American community.

In the commission’s early years, interference with its activities came from hostile southern officials who refused to comply with subpoenas to provide documents or to answer questions at hearings. Congressional opposition to the commission’s mission and criticism of its work also hampered its ability to function efficiently, as the continuing uncertainty over its future caused staff departures, morale problems, and difficulties in setting and carrying out agendas. Litigation resolved the question of the commission’s legitimacy, but the latter challenges - the effect of its temporary nature and worries about funding - continue to plague the commission to this day. But beginning in the early 1960s, a new type of conflict began to emerge - conflict with the executive branch itself.

Though technically part of the executive branch, the commission viewed itself as an independent voice whose role was to examine the facts and make findings and recommendations based on those facts, regardless of how unpopular those findings and recommendations might be. Chairman Hannah set the tone in his opening statement at the commission’s first hearing in Montgomery, emphasizing that the commission was not an advocate for any one view on civil rights, had no affiliation with the Justice Department, and was solely a fact-finding body. He told the audience that the commission had been established in the hope that through dispassionate evaluation and appraisal, "some sort of reason and light" could be brought to bear on issues that were "frequently and passionately debated but seldom soberly assessed."⁴⁶ Speaking at a SAC conference in Washington, President Eisenhower also stressed the importance of the commission’s fact-finding function. Moreover, he said "I think [the Commission] holds up before us a mirror so that we may see ourselves, what we are doing and what we are not doing, and therefore makes it easier for us to correct our omissions."⁴⁷

But in the early 1960s, tensions developed between the commission on the one hand and the White House and the Justice Department on the other. The dispute arose over the scheduling of a long-planned voting hearing in Mississippi. The Justice Department had twice requested that the commission postpone the hearing because of concerns about the effect the hearing would have on its own legal proceedings. Twice the commissioners agreed. In 1962, as the commission began for the third time to develop plans for the Mississippi hearing, Governor Ross Barnett attempted to block the admission of James Meredith to the University of Mississippi. President Kennedy called the Mississippi National Guard and sent in federal troops, as President Eisenhower had done in Arkansas five years earlier. While the Justice Department pursued criminal contempt proceedings against the governor, the commission proceeded with its own plans. Once again, the Justice Department felt the commission’s presence would interfere with its enforcement efforts. The commissioners again agreed to postpone the hearings but also decided to produce an "Interim Report" on conditions in Mississippi. Their decision was based in part on a report from the Mississippi SAC documenting increasing violence against African Americans and civil rights workers in the state. The violence had even touched the vice chair of the committee, whose home had been bombed.

The commission’s plan to release the report led to a confrontation with President Kennedy. Knowing that the report would be controversial, the commissioners had sent a copy to the president prior to publication with the understanding that if he did not release it, the commission would. During a meeting with Chairman Hannah and Staff Director Bernhard at the White House, Kennedy asked them to reconsider their decision to release the report. They declined. This would not be the last time the commission would incur the ire of a president, but in this case, Kennedy chose to defer to the commission’s independence rather than suppress the report. In his biography of Kennedy, Arthur Schlesinger quotes the president as saying to Hannah and Bernhard:

I still don’t like it. If the Commissioners have made up their minds, I presume they will issue the report anyway. I think they are off the track on this one, but I wouldn’t try to suppress it. That would be wrong - couldn’t do it anyway. It is independent, has a right to be heard, but I do wish you could get them to reconsider. ⁴⁸

The dispute between the administration and the commission made the newspapers, with one presidential advisor later characterizing the commission during this period as "free-wheeling" and "a somewhat uncomfortable ally in this struggle."⁴⁹ Yet the recommendations in the report generated even more controversy. The commission suggested that the president consider legislation to assure that no federal funds be provided to any state that refused to abide by the Constitution and laws of the United States; and that he explore his authority to withhold federal funds from the state of Mississippi until it demonstrated its compliance with the Constitution and laws of the United States. Even northern newspapers and magazines thought the commission had gone too far. Soon after the release of the report President Kennedy made clear that he did not support a blanket withdrawal of federal funds.⁵⁰

However, events in the South continued to shine a spotlight on the problems African Americans were facing, which illustrated the need for stronger measures to address those problems. In May of 1963, Birmingham’s police commissioner, Bull Connor, reacted to demonstrations organized by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. by turning fire hoses and police dogs on the demonstrators. The photographs stunned the nation. In June, Medgar Evers was killed in front of his home in Jackson, Mississippi. Demonstrations and rioting occurred in numerous cities in the South that summer. Also in June, George Wallace, now governor of Alabama, blocked the enrollment of two African-American students at the University of Alabama. In August, the March on Washington brought 250,000 people to the Lincoln Memorial to demand justice.

By early summer, President Kennedy was prepared to take a more pro-active position. Using the confrontation with Governor Wallace as the catalyst, he took the opportunity to describe the need for strong civil rights legislation in a nationally televised address. He framed the issue in the strongest possible terms: If an American, because his skin is dark, cannot eat lunch in a restaurant open to the public; if he cannot send his children to the best public school available; if he cannot vote for the public officials who represent him; if, in short, he cannot enjoy the full and free life which all of us want, who among us would be content to have the color of his skin changed and stand in that place?

Who among us would then be content with the counsels of patience and delay? One hundred years of delay have passed since President Lincoln freed the slaves, yet their heirs, their grandsons, are not fully free. They are not yet freed from the bonds of injustice; they are not yet freed from social and economic oppression.⁵¹

A week later, he sent to Congress the most sweeping civil rights bill in nearly a century. The provisions of the omnibus legislation were derived from many sources and included the recommendation of the Civil Rights Commission calling for funding cutoffs for any state or local program that practiced discrimination. The bill also called for a four-year extension of the commission, whose current authorization was scheduled to expire that September. Members of the commission and its staff director testified in Congress in support of the bill. However, it became clear that Congress would not act on the legislation that year, thus putting the commission’s survival in jeopardy. Once again, planning for future activities was suspended and staff began to resign. Two commissioners also left: Dean Storey resigned for personal reasons and Spottswood Robinson was appointed to a federal judgeship. Staff Director Bernhard also resigned to return to private law practice. But yet another last minute rescue - in the form of a Senate amendment to an unrelated bill already passed by the House - provided for a one-year extension, in that Congress would reconsider the commission when it took up the president’s civil rights bill the following year.

The assassination of President Kennedy that fall shocked the nation. The commissioners felt even further adrift despite President Johnson’s assurance that he would vigorously push for enactment of Kennedy’s civil rights bill the following year. The new president acted relatively quickly in 1964 to fill the vacancies on the commission, appointing Frankie Freeman, an African-American attorney from St. Louis and the commission’s first female, and Eugene Patterson, the editor of The Atlanta Constitution. They were not confirmed until the fall of that year. However, President Kennedy’s omnibus bill was enacted in July after lengthy debate. Not only were strong civil rights measures finally adopted - including a prohibition on discrimination in public accommodations - the commission was given a four-year lease on life. In addition, the commission was given a new responsibility, to "serve as a national clearinghouse for information in respect to denial of equal protection of the laws because of race, color, religion or national origin."⁵²

In early 1965, the commission finally held its Mississippi voting rights hearing despite continued resistance from the Justice Department. This time, Attorney General Katzenbach personally appeared at a commission meeting to ask for postponement on the ground that the commission’s presence in the state would prejudice an important prosecution. The case involved the murder of three civil rights workers - James Cheney, Andrew Goodman, and Michael Schwerner - the previous summer. The commission decided to proceed with the hearing. Chairman Hannah believed that the commission’s integrity was at stake and that canceling the hearing "would be a betrayal of all the Mississippi witnesses who had agreed to testify at great risk."⁵³ While the hearing elicited some signs of positive change, there was considerable testimony about ongoing obstructions and interference with the right of African-American citizens to vote. The hearing received broad press coverage and favorable editorial comment throughout the country.⁵⁴

In March, President Johnson submitted his voting rights proposal to Congress, with the commission’s hearing and the publicity surrounding it providing needed ammunition to supporters of the legislation. The commission’s report on the hearing was issued in May, as Congress debated the Voting Rights Act.⁵⁵ The report concluded that African Americans in Mississippi had been systematically denied the right to vote through official government action, fraud, and violence. The commissioners unanimously endorsed the president’s bill, which included a requirement that jurisdictions with a history of discrimination "preclear" all changes in voting procedures with the Department of Justice. If the Justice Department determined that the changes were discriminatory, they could not be implemented. The legislation also called for the appointment of federal registrars - one of the commission’s earliest recommendations in the area of voting. The commission report also recommended the abolishment of literacy tests and poll taxes (recommendations that did not become part of the 1965 legislation but were included in the 1970 Voting Rights Act extension) and the assignment of federal poll watchers.⁵⁶

The commission’s work on voting rights - culminating in the 1965 Mississippi hearing and report and the report’s role in the legislative process - represented a high point in the body’s influence. Father Hesburgh testified extensively in support of the bill, while Senator Edward Kennedy, D. Mass., wrote Chairman Hannah to say that "your assistance in this matter was of real significance in our attempts to strengthen the bill."⁵⁷ A year later, the Supreme Court rejected a major challenge to the constitutionality of the 1965 Act, relying in part on data published by the commission.⁵⁸

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the commission diligently monitored the effectiveness of federal efforts to enforce the civil rights legislation enacted during the Johnson administration. The commissioners recognized that the struggle to enact strong laws was worth little if the laws were not vigorously enforced. This monitoring function became a significant part of the commission’s agenda over the next two decades. The commission issued a number of reports during this time frame, continuing its work on school desegregation, as well as examining enforcement of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits federal funding of discriminatory programs. It began what became a multi-decade examination of the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s role in administering farm programs in the southern states, finding an ongoing pattern of discrimination. In 1970, the commission published the first in a series of comprehensive reports, The Federal Civil Rights Enforcement Effort, which included numerous findings and recommendations affecting all aspects of civil rights enforcement. Over the next several years, it issued a series of follow-up reports critical of the federal enforcement effort and calling for stronger leadership and direction from the president.⁵⁹

Next Section: The 70s: School Desegregation and an Expanded Mandate

44. Richard Kluger, Simple Justice (Knopf, 2004) (1975) at 756.

45. Dulles, note 23 above, at 101.

46. Id., at 33-34.

47. Id., at 83.

48. Arthur Schlesinger, A Thousand Days (Houghton Mifflin, 2002) (1965) at 953.

49. Dulles, note 23 above, at 180, quoting Theodore Sorensen’s book, Kennedy.

50. Id. at 185.

51. Kluger, note 44 above, at 756-757.

52. Pub. L. No. 88-352, Sec. 604 (1964)

53. William L. Taylor, The Passion of My Times (Carroll & Graf, 2004), at 69. Taylor’s book provides a fascinating and colorful account of the Justice Department’s efforts to pressure the commission to postpone the hearing.

54. Dulles, note 23 above, at 241.

55. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Voting in Mississippi (1965).

56. LCCR, note 8 above, at 61.

57. Dulles, note 23 above, at 245.

58. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 307 (1966).

59. Rise and Fall, note 7 above, at 467-468.